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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GARTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
We have granted en banc review to resolve a conflict in 
our court's jurisprudence that has surfaced following the 
publication of United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796 (3d Cir. 
1999), United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 1994), 
and United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 
1991), on the one hand, and United States v. Thomas, 998 
F.2d 1202 (3d Cir. 1993), on the other.1  In the instant 
matter, the District Court permitted the government, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence ("Federal Rule") 403, 
to introduce both the plea agreements and guilty pleas of 
two witnesses notwithstanding a representation by defense 
counsel that they would not challenge the credibility of 
such witnesses. The jury convicted all three defendants on 
a sole count of mail fraud. The panel majority reversed. We 
granted the government's petition for rehearing and vacated 
the panel decision.2 
 We will now affirm the convictions entered against 
defendants Universal Rehabilitation Services (PA), Inc., and 
Richard Lukesh. 
 
I 
 
Universal Rehabilitation Services (PA), Inc. ("Universal") is 
engaged in the business of providing various rehabilitative 
services, especially speech therapy, to elderly Medicare 
patients living in nursing homes. Universal would enter into 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Other cases addressing the admission of a testifying co-conspirator's 
guilty plea and/or plea agreement include the following: Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Mujahid, 990 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Werme, 979 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 
383 (3d Cir. 1986); Bisaccia v. Attorney General , 623 F.2d 307 (3d Cir. 
1980); United States v. Gullo, 502 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974); United States 
v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1949). 
 
2. The government did not petition for rehearing with respect to the 
original panel's disposition of Attila Horvath's appeal. See infra n.8. 
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contracts with several local nursing homes, and would 
thereafter send its speech therapists to treat patients on 
site. Rather than submit its bills directly to Medicare, 
Universal employed Independence Blue Cross ("IBC") as an 
intermediary processor. Under this arrangement, Universal 
would submit its claims to IBC, which would process and 
organize such claims before sending them to Medicare. 
 
Both federal law and the regulations promulgated by the 
Secretary of Health & Human Services authorize the 
Medicare program to pay only those claims that are deemed 
to be medically reasonable and necessary. In determining 
whether this criteria have been met with specific reference 
to speech therapy services, the Medicare program generally 
looks to four separate criteria: (1) the therapy must be safe 
and effective for treating the patient's condition; (2) the 
services provided must be sufficiently complex insofar as 
only a certified speech pathologist can provide such 
services; (3) if restorative treatment were ordered, the 
pathologist must expect that the services would improve 
the patient's condition significantly in a reasonable amount 
of time; and (4) the frequency and duration of the services 
must bear a reasonable and necessary relation to the 
patient's condition. In this criminal matter, the government 
contends that both Universal and its representatives 
intentionally altered the claims it submitted to IBC in order 
to meet these criteria. 
 Pursuant to a physician's orders, a Universal therapist 
would evaluate a patient's needs in order to determine 
initially whether treatment was necessary, and if so, 
propose a program of treatment. Once a physician approved 
the evaluation, this evaluation became a vitally important 
document for Medicare purposes insofar as it provided an 
assessment that the treatment was medically necessary for 
the patient. Indeed, Medicare reviewers specifically 
considered the evaluation in rendering reimbursement 
decisions. 
 
Once treatment of a particular patient commences, 
Medicare requires that a physician certify each thirty days 
that continued treatment was medically necessary. Further, 
Medicare will only pay for such continued treatment so long 
as the patient is progressing towards the goals referenced 
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in the initial evaluation, and as such, Universal therapists 
would write notes concerning the patient's progress. 
Universal would meet the thirty-day recertification 
 
requirement by having a physician sign a Medical 
Information Form ("MIF ") that contained a summary of the 
previous thirty days of treatment and the prescribed course 
of treatment for the thirty days to come. 
 
Universal would submit its Medicare claims to IBC 
electronically for IBC's review. According to Universal, IBC's 
requirements for the proper processing of its claims were 
elaborate, detailed, and extremely difficult with which to 
comply. For this reason, Universal and IBC often differed as 
to the proper interpretation of the Medicare regulations, 
and, indeed, the ultimate decision as to whether Medicare 
would reimburse a particular claim. Pursuant to a random 
auditing system, IBC ultimately requested Universal to 
provide documentation in support of certain claims that 
Universal had submitted. Irregularities in this 
documentation led IBC to investigate further, an 
investigation that uncovered the very "rewriting" scheme 
that is at issue in this criminal matter. 
 
The government alleges that between the summer of 
1988 and September 21, 1991, Universal and its 
representatives altered and rewrote certain Medicare claims 
in order to ensure that the Medicare program would 
reimburse such claims. Universal admits that this 
occurred, but claims that such rewriting had two forms: (1) 
honestly inserting omitted information so as to comply with 
Medicare regulations; and (2) altering initial evaluations, 
medical information forms, and progress certifications so as 
to reflect either the need for medical treatment or to certify 
that the patient was progressing because of treatment 
already provided. 
 
As for this latter form of rewriting, the government 
contends that initial evaluations were altered so as to 
provide the "appearance" that speech therapy was medically 
necessary for the patient, medical information forms were 
made to appear as if a physician actually had reviewed the 
patient's progress and recommended that the speech 
therapy continue, and finally, the therapists' personal 
progress notes concerning the patient were modified to 
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provide the appearance that the patient was improving. In 
order to obtain the required physician's signature, 
Universal and its representatives would photocopy the 
physician's signature on the initial form and paste this 
photocopy on the altered form. Only after the rewriting 
occurred would the claims be submitted to IBC for review. 
All of these efforts, of course, were intended to increase the 
likelihood that Medicare would reimburse Universal for the 
speech therapy services Universal claimed to have rendered.3 
 
On March 31, 1995, a federal grand jury indicted 
appellants Universal, Universal's Vice-President and 
Director of Finance, Attila Horvath ("Horvath"), Universal's 
Director of Operations, Richard Lukesh ("Lukesh"), and 
three other defendants4 on seventeen counts of mail fraud, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1341, and twenty-one counts of 
false claims, in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 287. Prior to trial, 
Julia Blum Bonjo ("Bonjo") and Penny Martin ("Martin") 
pled guilty to a sole count of mail fraud in connection with 
the scheme described above.5 Universal, Horvath, and 
Lukesh, also prior to trial, filed motions in limine with the 
District Court, attempting to prevent the government, 
pursuant to Federal Rule 403, from introducing such guilty 
pleas and plea agreements into evidence. At the same time, 
Universal, Horvath, and Lukesh each represented that they 
would not affirmatively challenge the credibility of either 
Bonjo or Martin during cross-examination.6  The District 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Fraud has been pervasive in connection with Medicare 
reimbursement. See Georgia Court, Keeping an Eye on Medicare Fraud, 
Cincinnati Post, Dec. 16, 1999, at 4C ("The Office of the Inspector 
General at Health and Human Services estimated that $12.6 billion [of 
$176.1 billion in Medicare payments were] improper."); Medicare 
Contractors Aren't Pursuing Fraud, Audit Shows, USA Today, Dec. 2, 
1998, at A1. 
 
4. The other defendants were Vicki Meitus, Mary Mongoven Conroy, and 
Julia Blum Bonjo. 
 
5. As stated above, Bonjo had been indicted with Universal, Horvath, and 
Lukesh -- the appellants in this appeal. Martin, however, pled guilty to 
a separate information filed by the government. 
6. Specifically, Lukesh's Motion in Limine stated, in pertinent part, that 
"Defendant asserts that at the trial of this action he will not raise the 
guilty pleas/plea agreements on cross-examination nor seek to raise any 
inference on which the accomplices [sic] pleas of guilty would be 
admissible to rebut." App. at 79. 
 
                                6 
 
 
Court held extensive oral argument on this issue, and 
reserved its ruling until after the trial had commenced and 
the government was prepared to call Bonjo as a witness. 
Citing to our opinion in United States v. Gaev , 24 F.3d 473 
(3d Cir. 1994), the District Court then denied the motions 
in limine and permitted the government to introduce both 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas and plea agreements as 
part of its principal case. In particular, the District Court 
stated that 
 
       if [Bonjo and Martin] testify the jury is going to 
       certainly wonder whether or not they have been 
       charged. It's going to wonder perhaps what they have 
       been promised by the prosecutor if anything and what 
       they may be getting in return for their testimony. 
 
       I think in weighing all of those factors with the possible 
       prejudice that I am going to allow the Government to 
       bring out the fact of the guilty plea and the fact of the 
       guilty plea agreement. 
 
App. at 1768. 
 
After the government had introduced the evidence of 
Bonjo's plea and concomitant plea agreement, the District 
Court immediately instructed the jury as follows: 
 
       Members of the jury, you've just heard . . . evidence 
       that this witness has plead [sic] guilty to a charge of 
       mail fraud and which involved matters of some of the 
       things that she has testified to here in this trial. 
 
       I caution you that although you may consider this 
       evidence, that is the evidence that she has entered a 
       plea of guilty in assessing the credibility and the 
       testimony of this witness, you should give it such 
       weight as you feel it deserves. 
 
       You may not consider the evidence that she has entered 
       a plea of guilty against any defendant, any in this case, 
       nor may any inference be drawn against any defendant 
       on trial by reason of this witness's plea of guilty. 
 
App. at 1966-67 (emphasis added). The District Court 
provided a similarly detailed instruction after the 
government elicited testimony concerning Martin's plea 
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agreement. App. at 2863-64. Finally, during its charge to 
the jury after the trial, the District Court instructed as 
follows: 
 
       Julia Blum Bonjo and Penny Martin entered into plea 
       agreements with the Government. Such plea 
 
       agreements are expressly approved as lawful and 
       proper by the United States Supreme Court and are 
       appropriate, are proper. Each witness' decision to plead 
       guilty is a personal decision about her own guilt. You 
       may not consider this evidence against the defendant 
       on trial nor may you draw any conclusions or 
       inferences of any kind about the guilt of the defendants 
       on trial from the fact that a prosecution witness pled 
       guilty to similar charges. 
 
       The testimony of such witnesses, as I indicated, should 
       be scrutinized with caution and give it the weight that 
       you think it should be given under all of the 
       circumstances. 
 
       And I indicated to you during the trial that the fact 
       that they entered pleas of guilty could not be 
       considered by you in determining the guilt or 
       innocence of any of the people on trial here. The only 
       reason the plea and the plea agreement were brought 
       out was so that you would know all of the 
       circumstances surrounding the entry of the plea, you'd 
       know the terms under which the plea was entered and 
       you could judge for yourselves whether the witness in 
       the trial is testifying truthfully or whether the witness 
       has a motive to embellish testimony or vary from the 
       truth. 
 
       That is the only basis or the only reason why the plea 
       and the plea agreement were admitted. 
 
App. at 4829-30. 
 
After deliberation, the jury found Universal, Horvath, and 
Lukesh guilty on count one of the indictment, which 
specifically alleged that Universal had engaged in mail 
fraud when IBC mailed a check to Universal representing a 
claim for treatment provided to one of its patients, Mildred 
Hynes, between February 15, 1989, and February 28, 
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1989. The jury, however, also found Universal, Horvath, 
and Lukesh not guilty on the remaining thirty-eight counts 
of the indictment. All three defendants then moved for a 
judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29, arguing that the government had introduced 
insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. On May 
31, 1996, the District Court denied this motion and 
proceeded to sentencing.7 On May 19, 1997, the District 
Court sentenced Universal to a fine of $25,000, Horvath to 
a period of three years probation, a fine of $10,000, and 
$705.20 in restitution, and Lukesh to three years of 
probation, a fine of $15,000, and $705.20 in restitution. 
 
Universal, Horvath, and Lukesh appealed the judgment of 
conviction and sentence to this Court, arguing that the 
District Court abused its discretion in admitting the guilty 
pleas of Bonjo and Martin, and in denying their post-trial 
motions for judgments of acquittal on sufficiency of 
evidence grounds. In particular, the defendants argued that 
the fact that the jury had convicted them of the same count 
to which Bonjo and Martin had pled guilty -- and had then 
acquitted them of the remaining thirty-eight counts of the 
indictment -- proved that the admission of Bonjo and 
Martin's plea agreements and guilty pleas had a clear 
prejudicial effect. 
 
The government cross-appealed, arguing that the District 
Court erred in sentencing Horvath and Lukesh by failing to 
consider the loss stemming from the fraud alleged in the 
other thirty-eight counts of the indictment on which the 
jury acquitted Universal, Horvath, and Lukesh --"relevant 
conduct" pursuant to sections 1B1.3 and 2F1.1 of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines -- and in failing to 
provide required findings of fact with regard to the 
sentences the District Court imposed. The government also 
answered the defendants' argument concerning the guilty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The District Court's May 31, 1996 opinion also revisited the issue 
presently before the en banc court; namely, whether it was an abuse of 
discretion to allow the introduction of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas. 
The court concluded that it had not erred, reiterating its concern over 
selective prosecution and that the witnesses' testimony would assist the 
jury in assessing credibility. 
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plea issue by arguing that a party cannot attack a District 
Court's evidentiary ruling made prior to or during a trial by 
referencing a jury's ultimate verdict. The government 
claimed that such hindsight could not be used to measure 
the District Court's exercise of discretion. 
 
In an opinion filed on February 11, 1999, the panel, one 
judge dissenting, reversed. More specifically, the panel held 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict Horvath of 
mail fraud, but that the government had introduced 
sufficient evidence to support the convictions of both 
Universal and Lukesh. As such, the panel majority 
remanded to the District Court to enter a judgment of 
acquittal for Horvath. 
 
The panel majority also held that the District Court had 
abused its discretion in allowing the government to 
introduce evidence of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas, and 
as a result, ordered the District Court to hold a new trial 
concerning the charges levied against Universal and 
Lukesh. Because of this, the panel majority did not reach 
the sentencing issues presented in the government's cross- 
appeal. 
 
On April 15, 1999, the full court granted the 
government's petition for rehearing en banc, and vacated 
the panel's opinion and judgment.8 See United States v. 
Universal Rehabilitation Servs. (PA), Inc., Nos. 97-1412, 97- 
1414, 97-1468, 1999 WL 239513, at *1 (3d Cir. Apr. 15, 
1999). Our order focused rehearing on the District Court's 
denial of the defendants' motions in limine, which sought to 
prevent the government from introducing Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas. See id.; see also United States v. 
Universal Rehabilitation Servs. (PA), Inc., 173 F.3d 914, 915 
(3d Cir. 1999) (directing parties to "file supplemental 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Our en banc order only vacated the panel opinion and judgment 
insofar as it concerned Universal and Lukesh. As such, the panel's 
holding that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to 
justify the jury's conviction of Horvath, and that the District Court 
therefore erred in failing to order a judgment of acquittal on Horvath's 
behalf remains unaffected. Because our holding today revives the need 
to address the government's cross-appeal as to the sentence the District 
Court imposed against Lukesh, we discuss that issue in text infra. 
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memoranda . . . set[ting] forth what factors should be 
considered by the District Court in ruling on the 
admissibility of a testifying co-conspirator's guilty plea"). We 
now affirm the convictions of Universal and Lukesh entered 
by the District Court. 
 II 
 
The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We possess appellate 
jurisdiction over Universal and Lukesh's arguments of error 
pursuant to the final order doctrine of 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
III 
 
A 
 
We have previously held that the admission of a witness's 
guilty plea and/or plea agreement9 is governed by Federal 
Rule 403, see, e.g., United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 478 
(3d Cir. 1994), and as such, the rule itself provides an 
appropriate starting point for our analysis. Federal Rule 
403 provides: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Universal and Lukesh claim that the terms"plea" and "plea 
agreement" should not be utilized interchangeably and that the District 
Court's admission of Bonjo and Martin's plea agreements was an 
especially grave abuse of discretion. Although we agree that the terms 
are not synonymous, we believe that the distinction that Universal and 
Lukesh attempt to draw is one without a difference as it relates to the 
Federal Rule 403 analysis. Once one accepts the premise that a 
witness's guilty plea has probative value, see text infra, especially with 
respect to the witness's credibility, the introduction of the terms of the 
plea agreement becomes a necessary complement to disclose to the jury 
that the witness has not been promised a "sweetheart deal" in exchange 
for the testimony. See United States v. Pierce , 959 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th 
Cir. 1992). Further, Universal and Lukesh have failed to identify any 
prejudicial effect that could flow from the introduction of the terms of 
the 
witnesses' plea agreements once the pleas themselves are accepted into 
evidence. As such, for purposes of our analysis, the District Court's 
admission of Bonjo and Martin's pleas and plea agreements are treated 
equally. 
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       Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
       probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
       danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
       misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
       delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
       cumulative evidence. 
 
FED. R. EVID. 403. As the text of the rule indicates, evidence 
that is otherwise relevant and admissible may only be 
excluded if the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. For this 
reason, a number of courts have held that Federal Rule 403 
creates a presumption of admissibility, and that district 
courts may utilize the rule only rarely to cause the 
exclusion of evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 79 
F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 1996); Hendrix v. Raybestos- 
Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir. 1985). As 
one leading treatise states, "[i]f there is doubt about the 
existence of unfair prejudice . . . it is generally better 
practice to admit the evidence, taking necessary 
precautions by way of contemporaneous instructions to the 
jury followed by additional admonitions in the charge." 2 
Weinstein's Federal Evidence, S 403.02[2][c], at 403-16 
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1999); see also Glen 
Weissenberger, Federal Evidence, S 403.2, at 87 (3d ed. 
1998) ("Rule 403 favors a presumption of admissibility."). 
 
We have also held that because the trial judge is present 
in the courtroom as the challenged evidence is offered, and 
is therefore "in the best position to assess the extent of the 
prejudice caused a party," the trial judge must"be given a 
very substantial discretion in `balancing' probative value on 
the one hand and `unfair prejudice' on the other." United 
States v. Long, 574 F.2d 761, 767 (3d Cir. 1978) (emphasis 
added); cf. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 
(1997) (holding, in the context of expert testimony, that 
"deference . . . is the hallmark of abuse of discretion 
review"). For this reason, we review a district court's 
balancing analysis pursuant to Federal Rule 403 for an 
abuse of discretion, see In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 
F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 1997), and accord great deference to 
the District Court's ultimate decision. 
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A district court's decision, therefore, cannot be reversed 
merely because we, as members of a reviewing court, 
possess a different view concerning the probative value or 
prejudicial effect of the challenged evidence. See Long, 574 
F.2d at 767. In order to justify reversal, a district court's 
analysis and resulting conclusion must be "arbitrary or 
irrational."10 Paoli, 113 F.3d at 453. Indeed, "[i]f judicial 
self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a [Federal] Rule 
403 analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate 
tribunal." Long, 574 F.2d at 767. With this in mind, we 
turn now to the application of these principles to the 
District Court's admission of both Bonjo and Martin's guilty 
pleas and the plea agreements that they executed with the 
government. 
 
B 
 
Any analysis pursuant to Federal Rule 403 must begin 
with a determination as to whether the evidence has 
probative value. It is well-settled that evidence of a 
testifying witness's guilty plea or plea agreement may be 
introduced for probative, and therefore permissible, 
purposes. As this Court has identified on numerous 
occasions, such purposes include: (1) to allow the jury 
accurately to assess the credibility of the witness; (2) to 
eliminate any concern that the jury may harbor concerning 
whether the government has selectively prosecuted the 
defendant; and (3) to explain how the witness hasfirst- 
hand knowledge concerning the events about which he/she 
is testifying. See Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476; United States v. 
Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Werme, 939 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 383, 384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986); see 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. As with other instances in which a district court exercises its 
discretion, we also have held that when a district court issues a ruling 
pursuant to Federal Rule 403, it must specifically indicate its rationale. 
See Paoli, 113 F.3d at 453 (quoting United States v. Murray, 103 F.3d 
310, 318 (3d Cir. 1997)). In the present matter, there is no dispute that 
the District Court more than satisfied this requirement, as it expressly 
stated at the time of its ruling that it believed Bonjo and Martin's 
guilty 
 
pleas would assist the jury in assessing credibility and alleviate any 
concern the jury held over selective prosecution. App. at 1768. 
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also United States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1208 (3d Cir. 
1993) (Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
 
As we held in Werme, "[t]he most frequent purpose for 
introducing such evidence is to bring to the jury's attention 
facts bearing upon a witness's credibility." Werme, 939 F.2d 
at 114 (citing Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1363). Universal and 
Lukesh, however, argue that witness credibility ceased to 
be a proper purpose for the admission of Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas once they promised, through their 
motions in limine, not to attack Bonjo and Martin's 
credibility. Jurors are instructed, however, in almost all 
cases, that they are to determine the credibility of all 
witnesses who testify. Indeed, they are so instructed even 
in the absence of an affirmative challenge to witness 
credibility. See 1A Kevin F. O'Malley et al., Federal Jury 
Practice & Instructions (Criminal), S 15.01, at 350 (5th ed. 
2000) ("You, as jurors, are the sole and exclusive judges of 
the credibility of each of the witnesses called to testify in 
this case and only you determine the importance or the 
weight that their testimony deserves.").11 We addressed this 
argument in Gaev: 
 
       When a co-conspirator testifies he took part in the 
       crime with which the defendant is charged, his 
       credibility will automatically be implicated. Questions 
       will arise in the minds of the jurors whether the co- 
       conspirator is being prosecuted, why he is testifying, 
       and what he may be getting in return. If jurors know 
       the terms of the plea agreement, these questions will 
       be set to rest and they will be able to evaluate the 
       declarant's motives and credibility. . . . [A]n attack is 
       not always necessary. 
 
Gaev, 24 F.3d at 477. Our sister circuits concur. See, e.g., 
United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1067 (8th Cir. 
1999); United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 1003-04 
(6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sanders, 95 F.3d 449, 454 
(6th Cir. 1996). As such, we are satisfied that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The District Court similarly charged the jury in the present matter. 
App. at 4825 ("[Y]ou are the judges of the facts and therefore in the 
process you are also the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses 
and the weight their testimony deserves."). 
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government may seek to introduce a witness's guilty plea 
and/or plea agreement even in the absence of a challenge 
to the witness's credibility. 
 
Universal and Lukesh argue, however, that the Supreme 
Court's recent opinion in Old Chief v. United States, 519 
U.S. 172 (1997), provides support for their argument. In 
Old Chief, the defendant was charged with violating a 
federal law, 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), which prohibits an 
individual previously convicted of a felony from possessing 
a firearm. See id. at 174. Because the government was 
required, as a part of its prima facie case, to prove that the 
defendant had previously been convicted of a felony, it 
sought to present evidence of such a conviction. See id. at 
175. Concerned that evidence of the previous crime would 
adversely influence the jury towards his defense, the 
defendant sought to prevent the government from 
introducing such evidence by stipulating that he had 
previously been convicted of a felony. See id.  The District 
Court refused to compel the government to stipulate, and 
allowed the government to introduce evidence of the prior 
crime. See id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 
finding that regardless of the defendant's offer to stipulate, 
the government was entitled to prove the prior crime 
through the introduction of probative evidence. See id. at 
177. 
 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the District 
Court had abused the discretion with which it was vested 
under Federal Rule 403. See id. at 178. Although the Court 
reaffirmed the general principle that the government "is 
entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice," it 
held that a defendant may avoid the introduction of 
potentially prejudicial evidence by presenting the 
government with an equally probative evidentiary 
alternative. Id. at 186. Finally, the Court held that a 
stipulation that the defendant had been convicted of a 
crime within the purview of the federal firearms law was of 
equal probative value to the government's proffered 
evidence, and as such, the District Court had abused its 
discretion. See id. 
 
Universal and Lukesh argue that they, similar to the 
defendant in Old Chief, presented the District Court with an 
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alternative that lacked the prejudicial effect of the 
government's proffered evidence -- a representation that 
they would refrain from any affirmative challenge to the 
credibility of either Bonjo or Martin. This alternative, 
however, presented the District Court with a much different 
scenario than that which faced the district court in Old 
Chief.12 First, the defendant in Old Chief offered to stipulate 
to an element of the offense, whereas Universal and Lukesh 
simply offered not to render any affirmative challenge to 
Bonjo or Martin's credibility. Second, and of greater 
importance, the Court's holding in Old Chief was expressly 
premised on the Court's belief that the defense's offer to 
stipulate to the prior conviction and the government's offer 
to introduce evidence of the same were equally  probative. 
See id. at 191. In this appeal, however, Universal and 
Lukesh's offer to refrain from affirmatively challenging 
Bonjo or Martin's credibility did not, and could not, carry 
the same probative value on the issue of witness credibility 
as the introduction of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas. 
 
Even if we were inclined to accept Universal and Lukesh's 
arguments concerning credibility, however, we have 
identified other purposes for which the government sought 
to introduce Bonjo and Martin's pleas and/or plea 
agreements. In particular, the pleas were admissible to 
counteract the possibility that the jury might believe that 
Universal and Lukesh were being selectively prosecuted. 
See, e.g., Gaev, 24 F.3d at 479. In other words, once Bonjo 
and Martin testified concerning their participation in the 
events for which Universal and Lukesh had been indicted, 
the jury reasonably might conclude that the government 
was attempting to single out Universal and Lukesh for 
prosecution. 
 
Finally, courts have also held that a witness's guilty plea 
is admissible to explain why the witness possesses 
firsthand knowledge concerning the events to which he or 
she is testifying. See, e.g., United States v. Halbert, 640 
F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981). Although one might view 
this as a corollary to the credibility rationale, members of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Universal and Lukesh concede that their analogy to Old Chief is not 
perfect. See Appellants' Supplemental Memorandum, at 19. 
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the jury may still question whether the witness's testimony 
is worthy of belief. The fact that the witness has pled guilty 
to an offense concerning the very events that required his 
or her testimony makes it that much more likely that the 
testimony is truthful and reliable, as an individual typically 
does not plead guilty to an offense in the absence of 
culpability. As such, the government was entitled to 
introduce Bonjo and Martin's pleas in order to answer any 
question the jury might have concerning how Bonjo and 
Martin possessed knowledge of the events and actions 
about which they testified. 
 
As a result, we hold that evidence of Bonjo and Martin's 
guilty pleas and their concomitant plea agreements were 
probative in terms of Federal Rule 403, despite Universal 
and Lukesh's representation not to challenge Bonjo and 
Martin's credibility.13 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Section IV of Judge Roth's dissent advances an argument that not 
even Universal and Lukesh have asserted. Her dissent charges that we 
have offended both subsections (a) and (b) of Federal Rule 608 by 
holding that the District Court properly admitted the guilty pleas of 
Bonjo and Martin. 
 
Federal Rule 608 prohibits the introduction of either "character 
evidence" or "specific instances of conduct" proved by extrinsic evidence 
in order to support a witness's credibility. The dissent claims that Bonjo 
and Martin's guilty pleas could be considered both "character evidence" 
and "specific conduct," and because the government introduced the 
pleas -- at least in part -- to support Bonjo and Martin's credibility, 
Federal Rule 608 bars their admission. 
 
The short answer to these arguments is that at no time did Universal 
or Lukesh ever raise Federal Rule 608 as a bar to the admission of Bonjo 
and Martin's pleas. Universal and Lukesh did not lodge an objection on 
this basis at any point during the District Court proceedings, and did 
not raise the issue before either the panel reviewing the District Court's 
ruling or this en banc court. As a result, not only was this theory 
deemed irrelevant by Universal and Lukesh, but by not raising it, they 
have waived any benefit they may have derived from such an argument. 
See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 849 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (en banc). Moreover, Federal Rule 608(a) applies only to 
opinion and reputation evidence that is probative of one's character, and 
it is beyond dispute that the guilty pleas do not fall into either of 
these 
 
narrow categories. Finally, courts have interpreted Federal Rule 608(b)'s 
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C 
 
We have repeatedly held that the government may 
introduce neither a witness's guilty plea nor his or her 
concomitant plea agreement as substantive evidence of a 
defendant's guilt. See, e.g., Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476; Gambino, 
926 F.2d at 1363. We discussed the rationale for this rule 
at length in United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 
1949): 
 
       The foundation of the countervailing policy is the right 
       of every defendant to stand or fall with the proof of the 
       charge made against him, not against somebody else. 
       The defendant had a right to have his guilt or 
       innocence determined by the evidence presented 
       against him, not by what has happened with regard to 
       a criminal prosecution against someone else. 
 
Id. at 142, quoted in Bisaccia v. Attorney General, 623 F.2d 
307, 312 (3d Cir. 1980). As such, the bald introduction of 
a witness's guilty plea concerning facts or events similar to 
that for which the defendant is on trial could have the 
prejudicial effect of suggesting to the trier of fact that the 
defendant should be found guilty merely because of the 
witness's guilty plea. 
 
Nonetheless, we have also consistently held that this 
prejudicial effect is typically cured through a curative 
instruction to the jury. See, e.g., Mujahid, 990 F.2d at 116; 
Werme, 939 F.2d at 113.14 Our sister circuits, once again, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
bar on "specific instances of conduct" to prohibit the introduction of 
conduct only if it is being used to either attack or bolster the witness's 
character (i.e., one's general disposition, see United States v. Doe, 149 
F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 1998)) for truthfulness. See, e.g., United States v. 
Pope, 132 F.3d 684, 688 (11th Cir. 1998). Because the government did 
not introduce Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas to prove that Bonjo and 
Martin generally spoke and/or acted truthfully, Federal Rule 608(b) is 
inapposite. 
 
14. Universal and Lukesh argue that we should revisit our rule that any 
prejudicial effect inherent in the introduction of a witness's guilty plea 
and/or plea agreement can be ameliorated through the use of a limiting 
instruction, arguing, inter alia, that juries cannot comprehend such 
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concur in this understanding. See, e.g., United States v. 
Prawl, 168 F.3d 622 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Tse, 
135 F.3d 200, 207 (1st Cir. 1998); Sanders, 95 F.3d at 454; 
see also Pierce, 959 F.2d at 1304. The jury in such cases 
should be instructed that it may not consider the guilty 
plea and/or plea agreement as evidence that the defendant 
is guilty of the offenses with which he/she is charged, but 
rather that such evidence is offered only to allow the jury 
to assess the witness's credibility, to eliminate any concern 
that the defendant has been singled out for prosecution, or 
to explain how the witness possessed detailed first-hand 
knowledge regarding the events about which he or she 
testifies. 
 
As recounted above, the District Court provided such an 
instruction at three separate occasions during the trial: 
after Bonjo testified, after Martin testified, and at the end of 
the trial when the District Court charged the jury. See text 
supra at pp. 7-8. The District Court's instructions, 
therefore, served to cure any prejudicial effect that might 
flow from the introduction of the guilty plea and/or plea 
agreement of a witness such as Bonjo or Martin. 
 
Universal and Lukesh, however, argue that our previous 
jurisprudence in this area suggests that limiting 
instructions are not sufficient to neutralize such prejudicial 
effect in situations where the defendant is charged with 
conspiracy and the witness whose guilty plea and/or plea 
agreement the government introduces is the individual with 
whom the defendant has been alleged to conspire. The 
genesis of this concern emanates from United States v. 
Gullo, 502 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974), in which we stated: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
limiting instructions. We are not persuaded by their arguments. See FED. 
R. EVID. 105 ("When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for 
one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another 
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence 
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly."); Spencer v. 
Texas, 
 
365 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1967) ("[T]his type of prejudicial effect is 
acknowledged to inhere in criminal practice, but it is justified on the 
grounds that . . . the jury is expected to follow instructions in limiting 
this evidence to its proper function."). 
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       The guilty plea to a conspiracy charge carries with it 
       more potential harm to the defendant on trial because 
       the crime by definition requires the participation of 
       another. The jury could not fail to appreciate the 
       significance of this and would realize . . . that"it takes 
       two to tango." A plea by a co-conspirator thus presents 
       a unique situation which may require the courts to 
       scrutinize more closely the purported remedial effect of 
       instructions. 
 
Id. at 761 (footnote omitted). The Gullo  panel stopped short 
of recognizing, however, any "distinction between cases 
where the plea is to a substantive, rather than to a 
conspiracy count." Id. In the instant matter, it is significant 
that both Bonjo and Martin did not plead guilty to 
conspiracy charges, but rather pled guilty to substantive 
counts of mail fraud. App. at 1966, 2863. In any event, we 
held in Gaev that the fact that the witness had pled guilty 
to a conspiracy charge was merely another factor that a 
district court must weigh in engaging in the Federal Rule 
403 analysis. See Gaev, 24 F.3d at 478-79. 
 
Accordingly, we hold that the detailed limiting 
instructions provided by the District Court cured the 
prejudicial effect, if any, flowing from the introduction of 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas and plea agreements. 
 
D 
 
As we stated above, we cannot reverse a District Court's 
conclusion under Federal Rule 403 unless such a 
conclusion is held to be an abuse of discretion, which we 
have defined as "arbitrary or irrational." Paoli, 113 F.3d at 
453. The District Court heard argument on the defendant's 
motion in limine and accompanying arguments concerning 
Bonjo and Martin plea agreements and guilty pleas at three 
separate instances during this criminal proceeding: (1) on 
May 3, 1995, prior to the testimony of FBI Agent Cook 
(App. at 806); (2) on May 9, 1995, prior to the testimony of 
Dr. Paul C. Moock, Jr. (App. at 1768); and (3) subsequent 
to trial in ruling upon the defendants' post-trial motions. At 
each instance, the District Court carefully and meticulously 
weighed the above-mentioned factors of credibility, 
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selectivity, and witness knowledge that inform the probative 
value versus prejudicial effect standard required by Federal 
Rule 403. At each instance, the District Court's balancing 
was careful and comprehensive in concluding that the 
probative value of Bonjo and Martin's plea agreements and 
guilty pleas outweighed any prejudicial effect. Recognizing 
our limited role as an appellate court, therefore, we cannot, 
and do not, hold that the District Court acted either 
arbitrarily or irrationally -- and therefore did not abuse its 
discretion -- in admitting Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas 
and plea agreements over Universal and Lukesh's objection. 
 
IV 
 
Having held that the District Court properly exercised its 
discretion in admitting Bonjo and Martin's pleas after 
consideration of the factors relevant to such a decision, it 
is evident that the opinions of United States v. Cohen, 171 
F.3d 796 (3d Cir. 1999), United States v. Gaev , 24 F.3d 473 
(3d Cir. 1994), United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1335 (3d 
Cir. 1991), and the cases that they followed, as well as 
Judge Rosenn's dissent in United States v. Thomas, 998 
F.2d 1202 (3d Cir. 1993), reflect the correct jurisprudence 
in this Circuit in connection with the admission of a 
witness's guilty plea and plea agreement. To the extent, 
therefore, that other decisions of this Court do not comport 
with the analysis or conclusion announced today, they are 
overruled. 
 
V 
 
One procedural issue remains to be resolved. It will be 
recalled that the original panel majority had vacated the 
District Court's judgment of conviction and sentence 
pertaining to Universal and Lukesh. Accordingly, the panel 
majority had not found it necessary to address the 
government's cross-appeal that argued that the District 
Court erred in sentencing Lukesh. 
 
We have held here that the District Court properly 
admitted the testimony of Bonjo and Martin as to their plea 
agreements and guilty pleas, and as a result, the new trial 
that the panel majority directed is not warranted. Rather, 
 
                                21 
 
 
our decision today affirms the convictions of both Universal 
and Lukesh. 
 
Because the panel majority did not find it necessary to 
consider the government's cross-appeal, this Court has 
never rendered a decision as to whether the District Court 
erred in the sentence that it imposed upon Lukesh. 
Moreover, because as earlier noted, this Court -- sitting en 
banc -- did not consider the sentencing issue that the 
government initially raised, that issue is presently still open 
and undecided as a result of our decision to affirm 
Universal and Lukesh's convictions. 
 Rather than decide this issue without briefing or 
argument, we will refer the government's issue on 
sentencing to the original panel to determine whether 
resentencing should be ordered to include the relevant 
conduct of acquitted activity pursuant to sections 1B1.3 
and 2F1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See 
generally United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997); 
United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856 (3d Cir. 1997). In 
addition, the original panel should dispose of the 
government's argument that the District Court should have 
made findings of fact concerning why it declined to consider 
the particular conduct in calculating Universal and 
Lukesh's sentences. See, e.g., E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Koppers 
Co., 626 F.2d 324 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom Judges 
Sloviter, McKee and Rendell join and with whom Chief 
Judge Becker joins except for footnote 12. 
 
I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the 
majority. The majority has affirmed the District Court's 
admission into evidence of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas,1 
over the defendants' objection, despite the defendants' 
agreement not to mention the guilty pleas on cross- 
examination or to raise any inference which these guilty 
pleas might rebut. I believe that in doing so the majority 
deviates from the result mandated by Federal Rules of 
Evidence 403 and 608. Moreover, the majority's holding 
would now make it possible for the government in a 
criminal case to introduce the guilty plea of a defendant's 
accomplice simply by claiming that this evidence must be 
admitted for the jury to properly assess the testifying 
accomplice's credibility. Because I conclude that the 
District Court abused its discretion by admitting the guilty 
pleas into evidence, I would reverse the convictions of 
Lukesh and Universal and remand this case to the District 
Court for a new trial. 
 
I. A. 
 
To demonstrate how the majority's opinion deviates from 
our existing precedent, I will first place this case in a 
historical context. In 1949, in United States v. Toner, we 
first considered whether the guilty plea of a conspirator was 
admissible as evidence in the criminal trial of an alleged co- 
conspirator. See United States v. Toner, 173 F.2d 140 (3d 
Cir. 1949). In Toner, we ultimately held that the trial court's 
admission of an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea, 
combined with a defective limiting instruction, required 
reversal of the defendant's conviction. See id.  at 142. The 
Toner Court's reasoning, articulated by Judge Goodrich, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Like the majority, I believe that the distinction between guilty pleas 
and plea agreements is, in the context of this case, a distinction without 
a difference. See supra Majority Opinion at 3. As such, I use the term 
"guilty plea(s)" to refer to guilty plea(s) and/or the corresponding plea 
agreement(s). 
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forms the foundation upon which the present case must be 
decided: 
 
       From the common sense point of view[,] a plea of guilty 
       by an alleged fellow conspirator is highly relevant upon 
       the question of the guilt of another alleged conspirator. 
       If A's admission that he conspired with B is believed, it 
       is pretty hard to avoid the conclusion that B must have 
       conspired with A. This is one of the cases, therefore, 
       where evidence logically probative is to be excluded 
       because of some countervailing policy. There are many 
       such instances in the law. 
 
       The foundation of the countervailing policy is the right 
       of every defendant to stand or fall with the proof of the 
       charge made against him, not against somebody else. 
       Acquittal of an alleged fellow conspirator is not 
       evidence for a man being tried for conspiracy. So, 
       likewise, conviction of an alleged fellow conspirator 
       after a trial is not admissible as against one now being 
       charged. The defendant had a right to have his guilt or 
       innocence determined by the evidence presented 
       against him, not by what has happened with regard to 
       a criminal prosecution against someone else. We think 
       that the charge given upon this point was contrary to 
       that rule and inadvertently, of course, deprived the 
       defendant of a very substantial protection to which he 
       was entitled. 
 
See id. (citations omitted). As Toner  highlighted, the danger 
of unfair prejudice when admitting the guilty plea of a co- 
defendant is more acute if the charge in question is 
conspiracy because a conspiracy requires an agreement 
between two or more individuals. See, e.g., United States v. 
Davis, 183 F.3d 231, 244 (3d Cir. 1999) ("A conspiracy 
requires agreement between at least two people to the 
illegal object of the conspiracy, though other participants 
need not be indicted.") (citing United States v. Delpit, 94 
F.3d 1134, 1150 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Krasovich, 
819 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir. 1987)). If two defendants 
allegedly conspired, and one defendant has been convicted 
or has pleaded guilty, the clear implication is that the other 
defendant is also guilty. This point has been re-emphasized 
in subsequent Third Circuit case law: 
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       The guilty plea to a conspiracy charge carries with it 
       more potential harm to the defendant on trial because 
       the crime by definition requires the participation of 
       another. The jury could not fail to appreciate the 
       significance of this and would realize, as the court said 
       in a similar case, United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 
       606, 614 (5th Cir. 1970), that "it takes two to tango." 
 
United States v. Gullo, 502 F.2d 759, 761 (3d Cir. 1974). 
Consistent with our holding in Toner, we have subsequently 
held on many occasions that a witness's guilty plea cannot 
be admitted for the purpose of proving a defendant's guilt. 
See United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 801 (3d Cir. 
1999) ("[T]he plea agreements of co-conspirators are not 
admissible to prove the defendant's guilt."); United States v. 
Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 1994) ("It is well 
established that the plea agreements of co-conspirators 
cannot be used as evidence of a defendant's guilt."); 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Mujahid, 990 F.2d 111, 
115 (3d Cir. 1993) ("It is well-established that a co- 
defendant's guilty plea is not admissible to prove the 
defendant's guilt."); United States v. Werme , 939 F.2d 108, 
113 (3d Cir. 1991) ("We have long recognized that evidence 
of another party's guilty plea is not admissible to prove the 
defendant's guilt.").2 
 
Implicit in, and necessary to, the reasoning of Toner and 
subsequent cases is the principle that if a witness's guilty 
plea is to be admissible at all, it must be admissible for 
some purpose other than proving the defendant's guilt. See 
Cohen, 171 F.3d at 801 (holding that an alleged co- 
conspirator's plea agreement is admissible for "some 
purposes"); Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476 (holding that an alleged 
co-conspirator's guilty plea is admissible for "some valid 
purpose[s]"); United States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1205 
(3d Cir. 1993) (holding that an alleged co-conspirator's 
guilty plea is admissible for "limited purposes"); Mujahid, 
990 F.2d at 115 (holding that an alleged co-conspirator's 
guilty plea is admissible for "other[ ] permissible purposes"); 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. These cases alone refute the majority's claim that an accomplice's 
guilty plea is presumptively admissible. See supra Majority Opinion at 
12. 
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Werme, 939 F.2d at 113 (holding that another party's guilty 
plea is admissible for "other[ ] permissible purposes"); 
United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 
1991) (holding that an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is 
admissible for "some valid purpose[s]"). Thus, the guilty 
plea is inadmissible, as a matter of law, unless presented 
for a valid or permissible evidentiary purpose. See, e.g., 
Thomas, 998 F.2d at 1203-06. 
 
We have then, despite this general rule against the 
introduction of a witness's guilty plea, recognized three 
valid, permissible purposes for which a guilty plea can be 
admitted into evidence. First, it may be admitted"in order 
to rebut defense counsel's persistent attempts on cross- 
examination to raise an inference that the co-conspirators 
had not been prosecuted and that [the defendant] was 
being single out for prosecution." United States v. Inadi, 
790 F.2d 383, 384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 
Second, a guilty plea may be admitted "on direct 
examination" in order "to dampen subsequent attacks on 
credibility, and to foreclose any suggestion that the party 
producing the witness was concealing evidence." Gambino, 
926 F.2d at 1364. This situation arises most often when 
the defense plans to attack an accomplice's testimony as 
being fabricated so that he might receive a less severe 
punishment in return for testifying. 
 
Finally, although not relevant to this case, a guilty plea 
may be admitted "to rebut the defense assertion that [the 
witness] was acting as a government agent when he 
engaged in the activities that formed the basis for[his 
guilty] plea." Werme, 939 F.2d at 114. 
 
In addition, some Third Circuit cases have suggested (in 
dicta) a fourth permissible or valid purpose. For example, in 
Gaev we suggested that, "[i]t may  also be proper to 
introduce a witness's guilty plea to explain hisfirsthand 
knowledge of the defendants' misdeeds." Gaev , 24 F.3d at 
476 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 
F.2d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir. 1981)). I am left wondering, 
however, how the introduction of a witness's guilty plea into 
evidence establishes the basis for his or her firsthand 
knowledge of the crime. Presumably, all that the 
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introduction of the guilty plea establishes is that the 
witness pleaded guilty. It is the witness's testimony itself 
that establishes the basis for his or her firsthand 
knowledge of the crime--the witness has firsthand 
 
knowledge because s/he was present during or participated 
in the crime, not because s/he pleaded guilty to the crime. 
 
B. 
 
In the present case, because the defendants agreed not to 
challenge the witnesses' credibility based on their plea 
agreements, we are presented with a more focused question 
than we met in Toner: Whether and under what 
circumstances a trial court can admit into evidence the 
guilty plea of an alleged accomplice, over the defendant's 
objection, when the defendant agrees not to mention the 
guilty plea on cross-examination and not "to raise any 
inference on which the accomplices' pleas of guilty would 
be admissible to rebut."3 
 
In United States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1204 (3d Cir. 
1993), we first considered this more restricted issue. The 
District Court in Thomas had admitted two co-conspirators' 
guilty pleas into evidence, concluding that admission was 
proper for the limited purposes of "aid[ing] the jury in 
assessing [the witnesses'] credibility,""establish[ing] the 
[witnesses'] acknowledgment of their participation in the 
offense," and "counter[ing] the inference that [the witnesses] 
had not been prosecuted." Thomas, 998 F.2d at 1204. In 
reviewing the trial court's decision to admit the guilty pleas 
into evidence, we noted that the Third Circuit had 
recognized two relevant, valid or permissible purposes for 
which an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea could be 
introduced into evidence, "to blunt the impact on a 
government witness's credibility of having evidence of a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Both defendants joined the motion in limine to exclude the guilty pleas 
of the two alleged accomplices. The motion stated in relevant part, 
"Defendant asserts that at trial of this action he will not raise the 
guilty 
plea/plea agreements on cross examination nor seek to raise any 
inference on which the accomplices' pleas of guilty would be admissible 
to rebut." Supplemental Brief for the Appellants at 23; see supra 
Majority Opinion at 6, note 6. 
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guilty plea brought out on cross examination by the 
defense," and "to prevent any improper inference by the 
jury that the defendant has been singled out for 
prosecution while the co-conspirators have not been 
 
prosecuted." Id. at 1205. We reasoned, however, that 
neither purpose justified admitting the guilty pleas into 
evidence, because the defendant had agreed not to 
challenge the witnesses' credibility based on their guilty 
pleas, and because the defendant had not suggested he was 
being selectively prosecuted. See id.4 We rejected the 
District Court's claim that the alleged co-conspirators' 
guilty pleas were admitted into evidence in order to 
establish their acknowledgment of their participation in the 
crime, pointing out that defense counsel did not challenge 
the witnesses' assertion that they participated in the crime. 
See id. 
 
Balancing the danger of unfair prejudice associated with 
the admission of the guilty pleas against their probative 
value pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, we 
ultimately held in Thomas that, "[i]n the absence of a 
proper purpose for the admission of the guilty pleas, the 
curative instructions of the district court were not sufficient 
to remove the prejudice to Thomas presented by the 
evidence of his co-conspirators's [sic] guilty pleas." Id. at 
1206. We concluded that we were "not left with the 
requisite `sure conviction that the error did not prejudice 
the defendant' " and thus concluded that "the introduction 
at trial of evidence of Thomas's co-conspirators's[sic] guilty 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In Thomas, we concluded that the case at hand differed from United 
States v. Inadi where the alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea was 
admitted only "to rebut defense counsel's persistent attempts on cross- 
examination to raise an inference that the co-conspirator's had not been 
prosecuted and [that] the defendant was being singled out for 
prosecution." Thomas, 998 F.2d at 1205 (citing United States v. Inadi, 
790 F.2d 383, 384 n.2. (3d Cir. 1986)). We noted that if the defendant 
violated the agreement and "attempted to raise an inference on cross- 
examination that [the defendant] was being unfairly singled out for 
prosecution, additional remedial steps could [then] have been taken." Id. 
at 1205 n.1. Presumably, "additional remedial steps" would have 
included introducing the alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea into 
evidence on rebuttal. 
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pleas was reversible error." Id. at 1207 (quoting United 
States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
Judge Rosenn filed a vigorous dissent in Thomas, arguing 
that the alleged co-conspirators' guilty pleas were properly 
admitted "(1) to bolster the credibility of the co-conspirators 
as prosecution witnesses; (2) to quell the inference that the 
co-conspirators were not prosecuted and that Thomas was 
thus `singled out' for punishment; and (3) to establish the 
basis for the co-conspirators' firsthand knowledge of the 
crime about which they testified." Id. at 1208 (Rosenn, J., 
dissenting). Contending that the alleged co-conspirators' 
credibility would be at issue regardless of the defense's 
assurance that it would not attack the witnesses' credibility 
with respect to their guilty pleas, Judge Rosenn 
acknowledged that his dissent was at odds with the Third 
Circuit's holding in Toner: "One could argue that credibility 
is always at issue and that my position thus effectively 
overrules Toner." Id. at 1209. However, Judge Rosenn 
argued that his position was in fact consistent with the 
holding in Toner: 
 
       [A] witness's credibility is only at issue when he or she 
       testifies about a relevant and disputed fact. Moreover, 
       Toner merely states that a guilty plea of a witness 
       cannot be used to establish the guilt of the defendant. 
       Thus, even if the guilty plea is always admissible for 
       the purpose of establishing the credibility of the 
       witness, that does not overrule Toner: Toner would still 
       require a limiting instruction, similar to the ones given 
       by the trial judge in the present case, to insure that 
       the jury understands that the guilty plea cannot be 
       used to establish the guilt of the defendant. 
 
Id. 
 
I cannot, however, accept the implications of this 
explanation, just as I cannot accept the majority's position, 
unless there has been a meaningful weighing of the 
probative value of the guilty pleas against the danger of 
unfair prejudice, as required by Federal Rule of Evidence 
403. 
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C. 
 
Subsequent to our decision in Thomas, we again 
addressed whether the trial court erred by admitting into 
evidence the guilty plea of an alleged co-conspirator, even 
though the defendant agreed not to challenge the alleged 
co-conspirator's credibility nor to raise any inference that 
would make the guilty plea admissible. See United States v. 
Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 474-79 (3d Cir. 1994). On facts nearly 
identical to those in Thomas, we held in Gaev that the 
alleged co-conspirators' guilty pleas had been properly 
admitted into evidence. See id. at 479. In conducting the 
requisite Rule 403 balancing, we concluded, consistent with 
Judge Rosenn's dissent in Thomas, that "[w]hen a co- 
conspirator testifies that he took part in the crime with 
which the defendant is charged, his credibility will 
automatically be implicated." Gaev, 24 F.3d at 477 
(emphasis added). Ultimately, in Gaev we went beyond the 
confines of Judge Rosenn's dissent in Thomas , holding that 
a witness's credibility in a case like Thomas  will 
"automatically" be at issue. Prior to Gaev , this proposition, 
that "[w]hen a co-conspirator testifies that he took part in 
the crime with which the defendant is charged, his 
credibility will automatically be implicated," had not arisen 
in Third Circuit jurisprudence. The consequences of the 
extension of such an expansive interpretation of our prior 
case law are illustrated by the majority's opinion in this 
case. 
 
II. A. 
 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states that: 
 
       Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
       probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
       danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
       misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
       delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
       cumulative evidence. 
 
Thus, evidence that is otherwise admissible and  probative 
of guilt must sometimes be excluded because of the danger 
of unfair prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g. , United States 
v. Sriyuth, 98 F.3d 739, 746 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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The District Court, in balancing the danger of unfair 
prejudice associated with Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas 
against their probative value, concluded that the probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. The majority, endorsing this conclusion, 
states: 
 
       The District Court heard argument on the defendant's 
       [sic] motion in limine and accompanying arguments 
       concerning Bonjo and Martin plea agreements and 
       guilty pleas at three separate instances during this 
       criminal proceeding: (1) on May 3, 1995, prior to the 
       testimony of FBI Agent Cook (App. at 806); (2) on May 
       9, 1995, prior to the testimony of Dr. Paul C. Moock, 
       Jr. (App. at 1768); and (3) subsequent to trial in ruling 
       upon the defendants' post-trial motions. At each 
       instance, the District Court carefully and meticulously 
       weighed the . . . factors of credibility, selectivity, and 
       witness knowledge that inform the probative value 
       versus prejudicial effect standard required by Federal 
       Rule 403. At each instance, the District Court's 
       balancing was careful and comprehensive in 
       concluding that the probative value of Bonjo and 
       Martin's plea agreements and guilty pleas outweighed 
       any prejudicial effect. 
 
Majority Opinion at 20-21. The record, however, belies this 
contention. 
 
On May 3, 1995, prior to the testimony of FBI Agent 
Cook, the District Court first heard argument on the 
defendants' motion in limine. See App. at 806-17.5 After 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The record suggests that May 3, 1995, was actually the last time that 
the District Court heard arguments on the defendants' motion in limine. 
The District Court stated: 
 
       All right, I asked you to come at this point so that we could have 
a 
 
       last opportunity to argue the motion in limine  and I addressed 
your 
 
       attention to the Gave [sic] case. Anyone wish to make any 
additional 
 
       arguments, you may do so. 
 
App. at 806. Regardless, this exchange on May 3, 1995, is the first point 
in the record at which the District Court heard arguments on the 
defendants' motion in limine. 
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hearing argument on the motion, the District Court did not 
"carefully and meticulously weigh[ ] the. . . factors of 
credibility, selectivity, and witness knowledge that inform 
the probative value versus prejudicial effect standard 
required by Federal Rule 403," nor did the District Court 
"careful[ly] and comprehensive[ly]" conclude "that the 
probative value of Bonjo and Martin's plea agreements and 
guilty pleas outweighed any prejudicial effect." Rather, the 
District Court simply stated: "I'll take all the time I have 
available to think about this." App. at 816. 
 
On May 9, 1995, prior to Dr. Paul C. Moock's testimony, 
the District Court ruled on the defendants' motion in limine. 
The District Court did not hear further argument on the 
motion, nor did the District Court "carefully and 
meticulously weigh[ ] the . . . factors of credibility, 
selectivity, and witness knowledge that inform the probative 
value versus prejudicial effect standard required by Federal 
Rule 403." The District Court simply made the following 
statement: 
 
       All right, I have weighed all of the factors and I think 
       in the context of this case we have had and from what 
       I know of or have heard by way of reference to Julia 
       Blum [Bonjo] and Penny Martin, I think it sounds to 
       me as if they are somewhat higher up in the structure. 
       And if they testify the jury is going to certainly wonder 
       whether or not they have been charged. It's going to 
       wonder perhaps what they have been promised by the 
       prosecutor if anything and what they may be getting in 
       return for their testimony. 
 
       I think in weighing all those factors with the possible 
       prejudice that I am going to allow the Government to 
       bring out the fact of the guilty plea and the fact of the 
       guilty plea agreement. . . . 
 
       I think this is exactly like the Gave [sic] case, only 
       there are more reasons here, because there are so 
       many people who have testified and in their testimony 
       have indicated a certain amount of wrong doing. And 
       they--it's pretty obvious haven't been charged and I 
       think it raises a very serious question in the minds of 
       the jury, especially as to people who are as I said 
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       before, higher up in the structure. What are they 
       getting for their testimony, how is it that these people 
       haven't been charged and it's better in my opinion that 
       the jury know it all. That's the basis of the reason. 
 
App. at 1768, 1771-72. The language quoted above clearly 
indicates that the District Court did little if any balancing 
but instead simply concluded that Bonjo and Martin's 
guilty pleas were admissible. In fact, the District Court 
mentioned only two of the factors that the majority 
highlights, glossing over them in cursory form:first, 
credibility, "what are they getting for their testimony," and, 
second, selective prosecution, "how is it that these people 
haven't been charged." Moreover, no mention is made by 
the District Court of the defendants' commitment not to 
raise these issues or of the possibility of admitting the pleas 
on rebuttal if the defendants reneged on their commitment. 
The majority's characterization of the District Court's Rule 
403 analysis as "careful," "meticulous" and 
"comprehensive" is undermined by this cursory Rule 403 
analysis. 
 
B. 
 
As set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403, and as the 
majority acknowledges, this case turns on whether the 
District Court properly weighed the probative value of Bonjo 
and Martin's guilty pleas against the danger of unfair 
prejudice to the defendants. Because a proper Rule 403 
analysis must consider both the probative value of the 
guilty pleas, as well as the danger of unfair prejudice 
associated with the pleas, I will first assess their probative 
value. 
 The District Court concluded that the probative value of 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas was limited to eliminating 
the appearance of selective prosecution and to informing 
the jury what the witnesses were receiving in exchange for 
their testimony. It is beyond question, however, that the 
probative value of this type of information would have been 
minimized by the defendants' commitment not to "raise the 
guilty plea/plea agreements on cross examination nor[ ] to 
raise any inference on which the accomplices' pleas of 
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guilty would be admissible to rebut." The credibility attack, 
based on any quid pro quo that the witnesses derived from 
the plea agreements, would not take place if the defendants 
refrained from employing this line of attack in their cross- 
examination. 
 
I am firmly convinced, moreover, that the evaluation of 
probative value cannot be made without a consideration of 
the defendants' commitment. The majority disregards the 
commitment, however, and focuses on the probative value 
associated with assisting the jury in assessing the 
credibility of the accomplices in response to jury 
speculation or in response to the defense's cross- 
examination attacking a witness's credibility -- a stage of 
the trial which need not occur if the defendants lived up to 
their commitment. 
 
In adopting this focus, the majority skirts the line 
between pointing out that these guilty pleas may have 
probative value and declaring that the guilty pleas 
themselves constitute substantive evidence of the 
defendants' guilt. It is black letter law, as the majority 
acknowledges, that a witness's guilty plea cannot be 
admitted as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt. See 
Cohen, 171 F.3d at 801 ("[T]he plea agreements of co- 
conspirators are not admissible to prove the defendant's 
guilt."); Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476 ("It is well established that 
the plea agreements of co-conspirators cannot be used as 
evidence of a defendant's guilt."); Mujahid , 990 F.2d at 115 
("It is well-established that a co-defendant's guilty plea is 
not admissible to prove the defendant's guilt."); Werme, 939 
F.2d at 113 ("We have long recognized that evidence of 
another party's guilty plea is not admissible to prove the 
defendant's guilt."). Nevertheless, by ignoring the 
defendants' agreement not to "raise the guilty plea/plea 
agreements on cross examination nor [ ] to raise any 
inference on which the accomplices' pleas of guilty would 
be admissible to rebut" the majority fails to appreciate that, 
in light of defendants' commitment not to raise the issue of 
the pleas, the probative value of Bonjo and Martin's guilty 
pleas is negligible. Moreover, the jury will then be presented 
with evidence that has minimal probative value but which 
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may improperly imply that because Bonjo and Martin pled 
guilty, Lukesh and Universal are also guilty.6 
 
C. 
 
Having considered the probative value of Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas, we must next assess the danger of 
unfair prejudice associated with admitting their guilty pleas 
into evidence. As the majority acknowledges, and as we 
have previously noted, "[t]he guilty plea to a conspiracy 
charge carries with it more potential harm to the defendant 
on trial because the crime by definition requires the 
participation of another." United States v. Gullo, 502 F.2d 
759, 761 (3d Cir. 1974). It is true that the defendants were 
convicted of mail fraud and not of conspiracy. Nevertheless, 
the offense of conviction, as it was presented at trial, in 
many respects was similar to a conspiracy. In order to 
obtain a mail fraud conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 1341, the 
government must prove that the defendant devised a 
scheme to defraud, that the defendant participated in the 
scheme with the specific intent to defraud and that the 
defendant could reasonably foresee use of the mails. See 
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693 (1975); Pereira v. 
United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8 (1954); United States v. 
Pflaumer, 774 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1985). As the 
scheme to defraud was described in the indictment and 
presented at trial, defendants, including Lukesh, Universal, 
and Bonjo, participated together in the scheme to defraud 
and obtain money from the Medicare program. Indeed, it 
would appear that the government could have elected to 
indict the defendants on a conspiracy count as well as on 
the substantive mail fraud counts. 
 
I find, however, that the majority trivializes the 
heightened danger of unfair prejudice presented by this 
type of situation, a situation that requires closer scrutiny of 
the Rule 403 balance. See Majority Opinion at 20. In the 
context of this case, the majority's characterization of the 
offense to which Bonjo and Martin pleaded guilty as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. will deal further with two other aspects of the probative value of the 
guilty pleas in my discussion of Rule 608 in Section IV and of limiting 
instructions in Section V. 
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"substantive count[ ]" while legally accurate, is also 
misleading. In the case of Universal and Lukesh, section 
1341 criminalized what was essentially a successful 
conspiracy to commit Medicare fraud. In fact, the jury 
found that Lukesh and Universal had devised a scheme to 
defraud Medicare by fraudulently re-writing and altering 
patient evaluations to increase the likelihood that Medicare 
would reimburse Universal for medical services that were 
not otherwise reimbursable. Bonjo and Martin pled guilty to 
participating in this scheme. Ultimately, on the facts before 
us, the distinction that the majority attempts to draw, 
between the "substantive" count of mail fraud under section 
1341 and the "non-substantive" count of conspiracy to 
commit mail fraud under section 371, is a distinction 
without a difference. Thus, the danger of unfair prejudice 
associated with the District Court's decision to admit Bonjo 
and Martin's guilty pleas into evidence is not only 
significant but also virtually identical to the danger of 
unfair prejudice associated with admitting into evidence the 
guilty pleas of two alleged co-conspirators. 
 
D. 
 
Having considered both the probative value of and the 
danger of unfair prejudice associated with Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas, we must next determine whether the 
probative value of these guilty pleas is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendants. The probative value of Bonjo and Martin's 
guilty pleas is negligible--the defendants agreed not to 
"raise the guilty plea/plea agreements on cross examination 
nor [ ] to raise any inference on which the accomplices' 
pleas of guilty would be admissible to rebut." The principal 
effect of this agreement is a reduction in the probative value 
of this evidence. On the flip side, the danger of unfair 
prejudice associated with Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas is 
significant--mail fraud, as a matter of law, involves a 
scheme or artifice to defraud, and Bonjo and Martin 
allegedly participated in this scheme with and under the 
direction of Universal and Lukesh. Thus, if Bonjo and 
Martin's admission that they committed mail fraud is 
believed, it is difficult not to conclude that Universal and 
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Lukesh committed mail fraud as well. As we noted in Toner, 
"[a] defendant ha[s] a right to have his guilt or innocence 
determined by the evidence presented against him, not by 
what has happened with regard to a criminal prosecution 
against someone else." Toner, 173 F.2d at 142. Clearly, 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas create a significant danger 
of unfair prejudice. This significant danger of unfair 
prejudice substantially outweighs the minimal probative 
value of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas. For that reason, 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 mandates that their guilty 
pleas be excluded. Thus, the District Court's decision to 
admit Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas into evidence was an 
abuse of discretion. 
 
III. 
 
By concluding that Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas were 
properly admitted into evidence, and by endorsing the 
holding in Gaev, the majority ignores the fact that, over 
time, Toner and its progeny have come to stand for the 
proposition that guilty pleas of co-conspirators are not 
admissible to establish the guilt of the defendant and can 
only be introduced into evidence for a proper evidentiary 
purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 
1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991); Werme, 939 F.2d at 113-14; 
Mujahid, 990 F.2d at 115. Following the majority's 
reasoning, unless a defendant is willing to refrain from 
cross-examining a witness entirely, the witness's credibility 
will always be at issue, and his or her guilty plea will 
always be admissible. While this may be the rule of law in 
other circuits, it is definitely not the rule of law in the Third 
Circuit. Compare, e.g., United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 
890, 899 (7th Cir. 1988) ("The well established rule in this 
circuit is that, on direct examination, the prosecutor may 
elicit direct testimony regarding the witness's plea 
agreement and actually introduce the plea agreement into 
evidence.") with Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1363 (holding that 
an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea can be admitted into 
evidence only for a proper evidentiary purpose). The 
majority's holding effectively overrules Toner  and its 
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progeny without acknowledging this fact or providing a 
reason for doing so.7 
 
The majority apparently concludes that Toner stands for 
the proposition that an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea 
cannot be offered as proof of the defendant's guilt; 
therefore, when an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is 
admitted into evidence, the jury must be instructed that the 
guilty plea cannot be used to establish the guilt of the 
defendant. While this may be a proper interpretation of 
Toner read alone, subsequent cases in the Third Circuit 
have recognized that, absent a proper purpose, guilty pleas 
of an alleged co-conspirator are inadmissible. Framed in 
terms of the balancing approach required by Federal Rule 
of Evidence 403, absent a proper purpose, the probative 
value of an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice 
to the defendants. 
 In light of our established precedent, I believe that the 
trial court in Universal erred by admitting into evidence the 
guilty pleas of two alleged co-schemers in face of the 
defendants' commitment that they would not, on cross- 
examination, challenge the credibility of the government's 
witnesses or raise any inferences that would make the 
guilty pleas admissible. Absent a proper evidentiary 
purpose, a trial court's decision to admit an alleged co- 
conspirator's guilty plea is improper and an abuse of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The majority is quick to focus on the following statement in Gaev: 
"While plea agreements have often been admitted in response to actual 
or anticipated attacks on a witness's credibility, an attack is not always 
necessary to justify their introduction," Gaev, 24 F.3d at 477-78. To 
support this proposition, the Gaev Court cites the following passage in 
Gambino: "In this case, the defendants began their attack on the 
credibility of the government's witnesses in their opening statement. Yet, 
even in the absence of this attack, the [introduction of the witnesses' 
guilty pleas] was proper here." Gambino , 926 F.2d at 1363. This 
statement, which is clearly dictum, is made without any supporting cite 
to case law in the Third Circuit or any other circuit. Such a statement 
is without support or foundation in Third Circuit jurisprudence, and 
since it is merely dictum, it alone should not provide the basis for 
affirming the District Court's decision to admit Bonjo and Martin's guilty 
pleas into evidence. 
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discretion. An alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea cannot be 
admitted for the purpose of proving a defendant's guilt. See 
Cohen, 171 F.3d at 801 ("[T]he plea agreements of co- 
conspirators are not admissible to prove the defendant's 
guilt."); Gaev, 24 F.3d at 476 ("It is well established that 
the plea agreements of co-conspirators cannot be used as 
evidence of a defendant's guilt."); Mujahid , 990 F.2d at 115 
("It is well-established that a co-defendant's guilty plea is 
not admissible to prove the defendant's guilt."); Werme, 939 
F.2d at 113 ("We have long recognized that evidence of 
another party's guilty plea is not admissible to prove the 
defendant's guilt."). Contrary to the majority's claim that 
"Federal Rule of Evidence 403 creates a presumption of 
admissibility," an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is only 
admissible for a limited number of valid, permissible 
purposes. See United States v. Inadi, 790 F.2d 383, 384 n.2 
(3d Cir. 1986) ("[A co-conspirator's guilty plea may be 
admitted] in order to rebut defense counsel's persistent 
attempts on cross-examination to raise an inference that 
the co-conspirators had not been prosecuted and that[the 
defendant] was being singled out for prosecution."); 
Gambino, 926 F.2d at 1364 ("[A co-conspirator's guilty plea 
may be admitted] on direct examination [in order] to 
dampen subsequent attacks on credibility, and to foreclose 
any suggestion that the party producing the witness was 
concealing evidence."); Werme, 939 F.2d at 114 ("[A 
witness's guilty plea may be admitted] to rebut the defense 
assertion that [the witness] was acting as a government 
agent when he engaged in the activities that formed the 
basis for [his guilty] plea."). 
 
As our analysis above demonstrates, when a defendant 
agrees not to "raise the guilty plea/plea agreements on 
cross examination nor to raise any inference on which the 
accomplices' pleas of guilty would be admissible to rebut," 
the Rule 403 balance clearly tips in favor of excluding the 
evidence.8 If an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As discussed below, the jury's verdict confirms that the defendants 
were in fact prejudiced by the District Court's erroneous evidentiary 
ruling. See infra Section VI. I note moreover that if a defendant reneges 
on a commitment not to impeach a witness's credibility on the basis of 
the guilty plea, the government will have the opportunity to introduce 
the guilty plea on rebuttal. 
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admissible at all, it must be admissible for some purpose 
other than proving the defendant's guilt. See Cohen, 171 
F.3d at 801 (holding that an alleged co-conspirator's plea 
agreement is admissible for "some purposes"); Gaev, 24 
F.3d at 476 (holding that an alleged co-conspirator's guilty 
plea is admissible for "some valid purpose[s]"); United 
States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1205 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is 
admissible for "limited purposes"); Mujahid, 990 F.2d at 
115 (holding that an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is 
admissible for "other[ ] permissible purposes"); Werme, 939 
F.2d at 113 (holding that another party's guilty plea is 
admissible for "other[ ] permissible purposes"); United 
States v. Gambino, 926 F.2d 1355, 1363 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that an alleged co-conspirator's guilty plea is 
admissible for "some valid purpose[s]"). Allowing the 
government, when prosecuting a criminal case, to introduce 
the guilty plea of a defendant's alleged co-conspirator 
simply by claiming that the guilty plea must be admitted 
into evidence so that the jury can assess the witness's 
credibility creates an exception that swallows the rule. The 
government will always be able to claim that a witness's 
guilty plea must be admitted into evidence so that the jury 
can assess the witness's credibility, and thus the guilty plea 
will always be admissible. It is impossible to reconcile this 
result with our prior jurisprudence or with the result 
mandated by Rule 403. 
 
IV. 
 
Focusing primarily on the jury's need to assess the 
credibility of Bonjo and Martin, and relying on a statement 
in Gaev and cases in other circuits, the majority concludes 
that the government may seek to introduce a witness's 
guilty plea even in the absence of a challenge to the 
witness's credibility. The majority's holding deviates not 
only from the outcome mandated by Rule 403, its holding 
is at odds with Federal Rule of Evidence 608(a) and (b). 
Rule 608(a) states: 
 
       The credibility of a witness may be attacked or 
       supported by evidence in the form of opinion or 
       reputation, but subject to these limitations: (1) the 
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       evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character 
       is admissible only after the character of the witness for 
       truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or 
       reputation evidence or otherwise. 
 
Arguably, under Rule 608(a), absent an attack on Bonjo 
and Martin's credibility, their guilty pleas are inadmissible. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 608(a), which 
summarize the policy behind the rule, indicate: 
 
       Character evidence in support of credibility is 
       admissible under the rule only after the witness' 
       character has first been attacked, as has been the case 
       at common law. Maguire, Weinstein, et al., Cases on 
       Evidence 295 (5th ed. 1965); McCormick S 49, p. 105; 
       4 Wigmore S 1104. The enormous needless 
       consumption of time which a contrary practice would 
       entail justifies the limitation. 
 
Thus, even prior to the enactment of Rule 608(a), as a 
matter of common law, evidence was admissible to bolster 
a witness's credibility only after the witness's credibility had 
been attacked. See, e.g., Perkins v. United States, 315 F.2d 
120, 123 (9th Cir. 1963) (highlighting "the general rule that 
until the credibility of a witness has been attacked by 
evidence pertaining to credibility, evidence tending to 
establish credibility is inadmissible") (citing Homan v. 
United States, 279 F.2d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1960)). 
 
Not only is the majority's holding contrary to Rule 608(a), 
its holding is also at odds with Rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) 
states: 
 
       Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
       purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' 
       credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided 
       in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. 
       They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if 
       probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
       inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) 
       concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or 
       untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for 
       truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to 
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       which character the witness being cross-examined has 
       testified. 
       Because Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas (or more 
 
specifically their decision to plead guilty) could be 
considered conduct under Rule 608(b), to the extent that 
the government introduced Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas 
to support their credibility, their admission is barred, as a 
matter of law, by Rule 608(b). See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b); cf., 
e.g., United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1178 (3d 
Cir. 1988) ("To the extent that [the probation officer's] 
testimony was an attempt to attack [the witness's] 
credibility by extrinsic evidence, it is strictly prohibited by 
Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b).").9  Indeed, the government 
argued in its briefs and during oral argument that Bonjo 
and Martin's guilty pleas should be admitted into evidence 
in order better to allow the jury to assess their credibility. 
Certainly, since Bonjo and Martin were government 
witnesses, their guilty pleas were not being introduced into 
evidence to attack their credibility but rather to bolster it. 
 
Consequently, the majority's conclusion that Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas were properly admitted into evidence is 
not only contrary to the result mandated under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 403 but also is at odds with the Federal 
Rule of Evidence 608.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Extrinsic evidence under Rule 608(b) is admissible for purposes other 
than supporting or attacking a witness's credibility. See, e.g., Lamborn 
v. 
 
Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522, 528 (2d Cir. 1989) ("[Rule 608] is inapplicable in 
determining the admissibility of evidence introduced to impeach a 
witness's testimony as to a material issue."). While the majority 
concludes that Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas are admissible for 
purposes other than evaluating their credibility, i.e., avoiding the 
appearance of selective prosecution and establishing a basis for the 
witness's knowledge of the crime, that the guilty pleas were admitted to 
allow the jury to evaluate the witnesses' credibility is the cornerstone 
of 
 the majority's holding. 
 
10. As the majority points out, it is arguable whether Federal Rule of 
Evidence 608 governs the admission of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas. 
See supra Majority Opinion at 17-18, note 13. However, even if one were 
to conclude that Rule 608 does not govern the admission of Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas, it is clear that Rule 608 provides insight into the 
appropriate balancing required under Rule 403. Specifically, Rule 608 
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V. 
 
While the majority's conclusion, that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas, is disturbing, equally 
disturbing is the majority's conclusion that "the detailed 
limiting instructions provided by the District Court cured 
the prejudicial effect, if any, flowing from the introduction 
of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas and plea agreements." 
Majority Opinion at 20. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
allows a party to introduce "evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation" to attack or support the credibility of a witness only after 
the 
credibility of the witness has been attacked. The majority contends that 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas are admissible to bolster their 
credibility 
 
despite the defendants' agreement not to attack Bonjo and Martin's 
credibility. This contention is at odds with the framework set forth in 
Rule 608. To admit Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas, absent a prior attack 
on their credibility, when similar evidence would, as a matter of law, be 
admissible under Rule 608 only after a testifying witness's credibility 
had 
 
been attacked, undermines the majority's entire Rule 403 analysis. 
 
Moreover, the majority's analysis of United States v. Old Chief is also 
at odds with the framework set forth in Rule 608. In arguing that the 
introduction of Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas has less probative value 
than the defendants' agreement not to mention the guilty pleas on cross- 
examination or to raise any inference which these guilty pleas might 
rebut, the majority overlooks the fact that "evidence in the form of 
opinion or reputation" is admissible only after the credibility of a 
witness 
has been attacked. See Majority Opinion at 16. Thus, under Rule 608, 
the comparison of probative value required under Old Chief and alluded 
to by the majority would be purely hypothetical and unnecessary; absent 
a prior attack on credibility, "evidence in the form of opinion or 
reputation" is, as a matter of law, inadmissible. 
 Finally, contrary to the majority's suggestion, the potential 
applicability of Rule 608 was not only discussed at the en banc oral 
argument, the government filed a supplemental brief after oral argument 
to address the issue. See Supplemental Brief of Appellee United States 
of America, Filed November 22, 1999 ("At oral argument before the en 
banc Court on November 8, 1999, the Court raised two issues which had 
not previously been addressed in this appeal: (1) The relevance of Rule 
608 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (2) the applicability of Luce v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984)."). 
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It is beyond dispute that when an alleged co-conspirator's 
guilty plea is admitted into evidence, even if the trial court 
has given a proper cautionary instruction to the jury, the 
prejudice to the defendant may be serious enough to 
constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Thomas, 998 F.2d at 
1206 ("In the absence of a proper purpose for the 
admission of the guilty pleas, the curative instructions of 
the district court were not sufficient to remove the prejudice 
to Thomas presented by the evidence of his co-conspirators' 
guilty pleas."); Gaev, 24 F.3d at 478 ("There may also be 
cases where the inference of guilt from the co-conspirator's 
plea agreement is sufficiently strong that even limiting 
instructions will not effectively contain it."). The majority 
not only concludes that this prejudicial effect is typically 
cured by a limiting instruction to the jury but also 
dismisses the defendants' contention that juries cannot 
comprehend or follow such limiting instructions. 
 
Moreover, the majority's analysis obscures what I 
consider to be the key issue: The District Court abused its 
discretion by admitting into evidence Martin and Bonjo's 
guilty pleas, over the defendants' objection, despite the fact 
the defendants agreed not to "raise the guilty plea/plea 
agreements on cross examination nor [ ] to raise any 
inference on which the accomplices' pleas of guilty would 
be admissible to rebut." While a limiting instruction given 
by a District Court may render an otherwise erroneous 
evidentiary ruling harmless, a limiting instruction cannot 
transform an otherwise erroneous evidentiary ruling into a 
legally proper evidentiary ruling. Ultimately, we must decide 
whether, the District Court, at the time it ruled on the 
defendants' motion in limine, abused its discretion by 
admitting Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas into evidence. To 
do so, we must focus on the probative value and  danger of 
unfair prejudice associated with Bonjo and Martin's guilty 
pleas and not on whether the District Court's limiting 
instructions cured any resulting, unfair prejudice. 
 
Moreover, the danger of unfair prejudice highlighted 
above renders both baffling and confounding the District 
Court's decision to instruct the jury "that it may not 
consider the guilty plea and/or plea agreement as evidence 
that the defendant is guilty of the offenses with which he is 
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charged," rather than to instruct the jury that it need not 
concern itself with the possibility of selective prosecution or 
what the witnesses have be promised in return for their 
testimony. See, e.g., Thomas, 998 F.2d at 1205. If, as the 
majority contends, juries comprehend and follow limiting 
instructions such as those given by the District Court in 
this case, surely the better approach, and the one most 
consistent with Third Circuit jurisprudence, is to exclude 
Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas and to instruct the jury 
members that they should concern themselves only with 
the guilt or innocence of defendants and not with the 
possibility of selective prosecution or the involvement of any 
other persons in any alleged scheme. See supra , Majority 
Opinion at 17-18, note 13; Thomas, 998 F.2d at 1205; cf. 
Spencer v. Texas, 365 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1967) ("[T]his type 
of prejudicial effect is acknowledged to inhere in criminal 
practice, but it is justified on the grounds that . . . the jury 
is expected to follow instructions in limiting this evidence to 
its proper function."). Instead of following our holding in 
Thomas, the majority relies on precedent in other circuits, 
citing one case from the Fifth Circuit and one case from the 
Eleventh Circuit, to support its conclusion that Bonjo and 
Martin's guilty pleas are presumptively admissible. See 
Majority Opinion at 12.11 Ultimately, the majority's 
conclusion that Federal Rule of Evidence 403 "creates a 
presumption of admissibility" with respect to an alleged 
accomplice's guilty plea, a conclusion that is crucial to the 
majority's holding, is unsupported by Third Circuit 
precedent.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The Eleventh Circuit case that the majority cites, Hendrix v. 
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1985), is a civil tort 
case. Arguably, there exists a heightened concern associated with the 
"danger of unfair prejudice" in the context of a criminal case. 
 
12. The majority attempts to draw support for its holding from a recent 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Old Chief , 519 U.S. 172 (1997). In 
Old Chief, the Supreme Court held that a trial court abuses its discretion 
when, in a prosecution pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1) for possession 
of a handgun by a convicted felon, it admits into evidence the name or 
nature of the defendant's prior conviction despite the defendant's offer 
to 
 
stipulate to his status as a felon under section 922(g)(1). See id. at 
190- 
 
91. While the issue addressed in Old Chief is not entirely unrelated to 
the issue presented in this case, a careful reading of Old Chief confirms 
that it provides no support to either the majority or the dissent in this 
case. 
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VI. 
 
Although the District Court abused its discretion by 
admitting into evidence Bonjo and Martin's guilty pleas, I 
must also consider whether its evidentiary ruling amounts 
to harmless error. See, e.g., United States v. Werme, 939 
F.2d at 111 ("We also conclude that it was harmless error 
to introduce the [witnesses'] guilty pleas."). An error at trial 
is harmless if an appellate court concludes that there is a 
"high probability" that the error did not affect the 
defendant's substantial rights. Id. at 116-17. Phrased 
differently, an appellate court must have "a sure conviction 
that the error did not prejudice the defendant, but need not 
disprove every reasonably possibility of prejudice" to 
conclude that the error was harmless. United States v. 
Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
Reviewing the record, it is clear that the District Court's 
erroneous evidentiary ruling was not harmless error. Of the 
thirty-nine counts that the defendants were charged with, 
they were acquitted on thirty-eight counts and were 
convicted on only one count, the count to which 
government witness Judy Blum Bonjo pleaded guilty. 
Further suggesting the likelihood of prejudice, the count on 
which the defendants were convicted involved a patient 
named Mildred Hynes, but Mildred Hynes was involved in 
four other counts on which the defendants were acquitted. 
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, discarding Bonjo's 
and Martin's guilty pleas, the evidence against the 
defendants on Counts Two through Thirty-Nine was 
virtually identical to the evidence presented on the single 
count which the defendants were convicted. In light of 
these facts, I believe that the error here could not be 
harmless. 
 
VII. 
 
For the above reasons, I would reverse the defendants' 
convictions and remand the case to the District Court for a 
new trial. 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, dissenting: 
 
I am in full agreement with the reasoning and conclusion 
expressed by the principal dissent in this case--which 
would hold that the District Court erred in admitting 
evidence that the defendants' co-conspirators had entered 
guilty pleas for their respective roles in the underlying 
health-care fraud conspiracy--except insofar as that 
opinion disclaims reliance on Old Chief v. United States, 
519 U.S. 172 (1997). See Dissent at 29 n.12 (Roth, J.). I am 
of the opinion that Old Chief strongly supports the 
defendants' position, and write separately to explain that 
view. 
 
I read Old Chief as standing for three important 
propositions: First, it makes clear that defense stipulations, 
such as the assurances offered by the defendants in this 
case, are acceptable, if not favored or required, in certain 
limited circumstances. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 190-92. 
Second, it holds that the government's general prerogative 
to prosecute its case as it sees fit must necessarily yield to 
the dictates of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See id. at 
191. Third, it tracks the advisory committee notes to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, and confirms that proffered 
evidence must not be analyzed as an island to itself (as the 
majority seems to do, here), but rather, compared to the 
availability of other means of proof on the same point. See 
id. at 184. Against this background, I believe that the case 
for allowing a stipulation in this case is even stronger than 
it was in Old Chief. 
 
In Old Chief, the defendant, charged with being a felon in 
possession of a firearm, had offered to stipulate to an 
element of the offense with which he was charged: having 
a prior felony conviction. The government refused to accept 
the offer, and over the defendant's objection, it introduced 
evidence regarding the name and nature of the defendant's 
underlying felony conviction. The Supreme Court held that 
the district court had abused its discretion in admitting the 
evidence of the underlying conviction. The Court held that 
the defendant's stipulation should have been received and 
that the government's introduction of evidence should have 
been limited, notwithstanding the government's general 
prerogative to choose its own evidence. See 519 U.S. at 
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190. The Court reasoned that it was proper to allow such 
a stipulation because the evidence regarding the name and 
nature of the prior felony conviction (assault causing 
serious bodily injury) failed the Rule 403 balancing test. 
 
Although the name and nature of the offense were 
certainly relevant to prove that the defendant had been 
convicted of a felony, see id. at 178-79, the defendant's 
offered stipulation was more probative evidence--in fact, it 
was conclusive evidence--that the element was established. 
See id. at 186, 190. The evidence regarding the name of the 
offense and the nature of the crime was therefore rendered 
surplusage, as it was less conclusive proof of the element, 
see id. at 186, and as it was neither necessary to help the 
government create a cohesive narrative about the crime 
charged, see id. 190-92, nor "proper nourishment for the 
jurors' sense of obligation to vindicate the public interest," 
id. at 190. 
 
The evidence regarding the name of the offense and the 
nature of the crime was also problematic because it posed 
a greater risk of undue prejudice than did the stipulation 
and an accompanying jury instruction. See id.  at 191-92. 
Evidence of the prior conviction could be used by the jury 
to draw an improper character inference or could lead the 
jury to believe that the defendant was a bad person, 
deserving of punishment whether he was guilty or not. See 
id. at 181. Therefore, the Court held that the defendant's 
offered stipulation should have been admitted, and the jury 
appropriately instructed on this issue. See id.  at 192. 
 
Here, the defendants offered to stipulate to a collateral 
matter--the content of their cross-examination--rather 
than an element of the offense that the government had the 
burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
defendants promised that they would not assert a selective 
prosecution defense, and that they would not impeach the 
co-conspirators on the ground that they were biased 
because they had entered guilty pleas. The government has 
argued that it had the right to introduce evidence of the 
guilty pleas, even though the defendants promised not to 
pursue these lines of cross-examination, because jurors 
might independently reach the conclusion that the 
government had engaged in selective prosecution or that 
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the co-conspirators were biased and were unduly shifting 
blame to the defendants. 
 
The evidence that the government proffered--the co- 
conspirators' guilty pleas--was surely relevant as tending to 
allay these juror concerns. See Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 188- 
89. But, given the context of the case, and when compared 
to alternative means of addressing those concerns, the 
government's introduction of the guilty pleas, as with the 
government proffer in Old Chief, fails the Rule 403 
balancing test. Once the defendants offered their 
stipulation, the probative value of the guilty pleas was 
greatly reduced: They no longer affirmatively rebutted a 
selective prosecution defense, and they no longer could be 
used to dampen subsequent attacks on credibility, as those 
attacks were no longer coming. 
 
Moreover, the guilty pleas were not a necessary part of 
the "coherent narrative" of the case, a factor that would 
normally militate in favor of the government's position. Old 
Chief, 502 U.S. at 192. United States v. Toner's general rule 
makes clear that co-conspirators' guilty pleas are normally 
inadmissible, see 173 F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1949); hence 
it follows that such evidence need not necessarily be part of 
the government's case in chief. Given the defendants' 
stipulation, the guilty pleas' only probative force was their 
tendency to allay hypothesized suspicions in the minds of 
the jurors about why the government had chosen to 
prosecute the defendants, and about the credibility of 
witnesses who had participated in criminal activity with the 
defendants, but were not facing prosecution. 
 
As Judge Roth ably demonstrates, the danger of unfair 
prejudice inherent in this evidence is great. The jurors 
could infer from the co-conspirators' guilty pleas that the 
defendants must also be guilty if their co-conspirators were 
willing to plead guilty to such crimes. As in Old Chief, 
where the fear was that the name and nature of the 
defendant's underlying felony conviction could mislead or 
over-persuade jurors by "lur[ing]" them to engage in a 
"sequence of bad character reasoning," Old Chief, 519 U.S. 
at 185, the evidence of the co-conspirators' guilty pleas 
carried with it the potential to deprive the defendants of 
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their right to "stand or fall with the proof of the charge 
made against him," Toner, 173 F.2d at 142. 
 
When compared to the alternative way in which the 
jurors' suspicions about co-conspirators' guilty pleas could 
have been allayed, it is clear that, as in Old Chief, the 
defendants' stipulation should have been accepted. As 
Judge Roth points out, the District Court could have 
instructed the jury that it should not concern itself with 
selective prosecution or what the co-conspirators were 
promised in return for their testimony. Instead, the District 
Court allowed the pleas to come into evidence and then 
gave a "Toner instruction" admonishing the jurors that they 
could not infer from the co-conspirators' guilty pleas that 
the defendants were also guilty. 
 
When one compares the probative value and danger of 
unfair prejudice inherent in these two scenarios, the former 
far better comports with the dictates of Rule 403 and the 
Court's admonitions in Old Chief. Judge Roth's suggested 
mode of presentation takes less time and is more direct. In 
her suggested mode of presentation, the judge makes 
definitively clear to the jury that selective prosecution and 
claims of bias are not at issue. Under Judge Roth's theory, 
the danger of the impermissible Toner inference is avoided 
because the guilty pleas are not introduced. Lastly, and 
perhaps most importantly, this mode of presentation does 
not interfere with the government's ability to present a 
"coherent narrative" regarding its case. Old Chief, 502 U.S. 
at 192. If anything, it forecloses the possibility that the jury 
will focus on a tangential and unimportant parts of the 
criminal "plot," and it does so without depriving the jury of 
facts crucial to its understanding of the defendants' 
criminal conspiracy. The defendants' co-conspirators 
testified at length regarding the defendants' myriad acts of 
health care fraud; understanding the means by which the 
defendants' allegedly defrauded the government was in no 
way contingent upon the knowledge that the defendants' 
co-conspirators pled guilty--they testified that they had 
witnessed these crimes first hand. 
 
In contrast, the mode of presentation endorsed by the 
majority is far more circuitous and confusing because it 
addresses only a potential concern the jurors may have. The 
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fact that the government elicits testimony regarding the 
guilty pleas does not mean that the jury will not conclude 
that selective prosecution or blame shifting were at issue. 
Additionally, the impermissible Toner inference could still 
be made, notwithstanding the instruction that jurors must 
not draw the inference. 
 
The majority attempts to bolster its position by stating 
that the defendants' offer "to refrain from affirmatively 
challenging [their co-conspirators'] credibility did not, and 
could not, carry the same probative value on the issue of 
witness credibility as the introduction of [their] pleas." 
Majority at 16. To me, at least, this argument makes no 
sense. If, complying with their offered stipulation, the 
defendants do not challenge their co-conspirators' 
credibility and the District Court instructs the jury not to 
infer that the co-conspirators are biased, their credibility on 
this point is unimpeached. There is no need for evidence, 
probative or not, on this point. The majority, instead, would 
have the government bolster the co-conspirators' credibility 
before it is challenged with probative evidence--in 
contradiction to the admonitions in Rule 608, as Judge 
Roth points out--and then invite the defendants to attack 
the witnesses' credibility on this issue. This takes far more 
time, is more likely to confuse the jury, and puts at issue 
a point, tangential to the trial, when it clearly need not be, 
especially when it carries with it the twin dangers of unfair 
prejudice. The Federal Rules of Evidence are grounded in 
truth, economy, and fairness, see Fed. R. Evid. 102; the 
majority's approach seems to ignore these aspirations. 
 
As in Old Chief, rather than present the jury with 
potentially unfairly prejudicial evidence and then instruct 
against an improper inference, the correct thing to do in 
this case was to accept the defendants' stipulation and then 
to instruct the jury as to how to deal with the stipulation 
properly. In Old Chief, that meant making sure that the 
jury understood what the stipulation meant: that the 
government had definitively satisfied the felony status 
element in its felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm prosecution. 
Here, it should have meant instructing the jury that the 
defendants would not be asserting a selective prosecution 
defense or that the co-conspirator witnesses were 
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attempting to receive a sweetheart deal by shifting blame to 
the defendants. In not proceeding in this manner, I agree 
with my fellow dissenters' conclusion that the District 
Court, as did the district court in Old Chief , abused its 
discretion. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
I join Judge Roth's persuasive dissent. I write separately 
because I joined the opinion in United States v. Gaev, 24 
F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 1994), an opinion on which the majority 
relies and with which Judge Roth takes issue. 
 
As the majority correctly notes, our precedent on the 
issue of the admissibility of a witnesses's guilty plea does 
not always follow a consistent line. The en banc procedure 
provides us with a valuable opportunity to reconsider our 
positions on important issues such as that presented here. 
 
I begin with the proposition that the Federal Rules of 
Evidence do not provide a hard and fast rule covering the 
situation before us today. Instead, the question of whether 
to admit evidence of a co-conspirator witness's guilty plea 
in the trial of his or her alleged confederate must be 
subjected to the balancing required by Fed. R. Evid. 403. In 
Gaev, we emphasized that the "standard remains that of 
Federal Rule of Evidence Procedure 403" and recognized 
that "[t]here may . . . be cases where the inference of guilt 
from the co-conspirator's plea agreement is sufficiently 
strong that even limiting instructions will not effectively 
contain it." Gaev, 24 F.3d at 478. 
 I dissent from the majority's position because I view its 
analysis as permitting the government to introduce 
evidence of a co-conspirator witness's guilty plea in all 
cases, as long as the district court provides a curative 
instruction to the jury. This is inconsistent with the 
principle established in this circuit that a witness's guilty 
plea cannot be used as evidence of the defendant's guilt. 
See United States v. Cohen, 171 F.3d 796, 801 (3d Cir. 
1999); United States v. Gaev, 24 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 
1994); United States v. Thomas, 998 F.2d 1202, 1206 (3d 
Cir. 1993); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Mujahid, 990 
F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v. Werme, 939 
F.2d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Toner, 173 
F.2d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 1949). The majority's holding that a 
guilty plea is admissible to permit the jury to assess the 
credibility of the witness, even in the absence of an attack 
on the witness's credibility, or to dispel jury concern about 
selective prosecution, even if the defendant has not so 
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contended, transmutes a case-by-case analysis under Fed. 
R. Evid. 403 into a general rule of admissibility. I see no 
justification for such a rule.1 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It is significant that defendants here did not contest the acts on 
which 
 
the prosecution is based, whereas in Gaev the defendant "challenged 
critical aspects of Gaev's participation in the activities that formed the 
basis of Gaev's conviction." Gaev, 24 F. 3d at 478. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
I am pleased to join in my colleague's excellent dissenting 
opinion, and I write separately only to go one step further 
than she did with respect to the application of the Rule 403 
balancing test. I submit that the probative value of a guilty 
plea is not just negligible, but nil. At the same time, given 
the unique setting of this case, there is not merely a danger 
of prejudice, but the prejudice is obvious and real. 
 
The majority seems to be saying that relevance is equated 
to whatever the jury might like to know, which I believe is 
precisely how the District Court viewed the issue. How is 
our ruling any different from letting the prosecution 
introduce a witness's Boy Scout badges and lie detector 
results on direct examination because a jury may wonder if 
the witness is telling the truth? Why should we concern 
ourselves that the jury may wonder about credibility and 
selective prosecution? What relevance do they have to the 
government's case? I submit that they have absolutely 
none. 
 
Even if credibility and selective prosecution were 
somehow relevant to the government's case, the 
prosecution could satisfy the jury's curiosity as to these 
issues just as easily by engaging in the following exchange 
with the witness: 
 
       Question: Are you being prosecuted by the 
       government? 
 
       (Response: Yes.) 
 
       Question: Have you admitted that you were involved 
       in the events about which you are 
       testifying? 
 
       (Response: Yes.) 
 
This line of questioning addresses credibility and 
selective prosecution while it leaves open the crucial 
question of guilt of the offense charged, which is the most 
dangerous aspect of the admissibility of a guilty plea in this 
unique setting. Under the facts of this case, the defendants 
do not deny that they participated in the same conduct as 
the witness. They contend, however, that this conduct was 
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not a crime. When another participant testifies that she 
admitted her guilt of the offense, she not only tells the jury 
that "what we did is a crime," but she also says "I owned 
up to it; why won't the defendants? Why are they putting 
you through a trial when we are guilty?" The probable 
prejudice in a case such as this is immense and far 
outweighs the relevance, especially because the relevance, 
I submit, is illusory. 
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